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 This paper analyses the trajectory of the Spanish automobile firm FASA-Renault during 
the 1970s. This period comprises the early years of the crisis experienced by the 
Spanish economy and industry between 1974 and 1985. At the external level, the 
Spanish economy was affected by two oil shocks. At an internal level, the automobile 
industry was affected by a decree passed by the government: the so-called “Ford” 
decree of 1972, which allowed the establishment of the American company in Spain 
and had serious consequences for SEAT, the main Spanish producer. The production of 
SEAT suffered a one third reduction between 1972 and 1980 and, in addition, the 
financial situation of the firm was unsustainable. Conversely, during this stage FASA-
Renault became the main Spanish production (its outpout was multiplied by 3,5 during 
the 1970s) and sales leader in Spain (its sales as percentage of total Spanish market 
sales increased from 23 to 36%). The main aim of this paper is to analyse the trajectory 




Aquest treball analitza la trajectòria de l’empresa FASA-Renault durant la dècada dels 
setanta del segle XX. Aquest període compren els primers anys de la crisis 
experimentada per l’economia i la industria espanyola entre 1974 y 1985. A nivell 
extern, l’economia espanyola es va veure afectada per dos xocs en el preu del petroli. A 
nivell intern, la industria de l’automòbil es va veure afectat per un decret 
governamental: es tractava de l’anomenat decret “Ford”, aprovat l’any 1972, el qual 
facilitava l’establiment de Ford a Espanya. Aquest decret va tenir greus conseqüències 
per a SEAT, el principal productor espanyol. Entre 1972 y 1980 la producció de SEAT 
es va reduir en una tercera part i la seva situació financera va esdevenir insostenible. Per 
contra, en aquest període FASA-Renault va esdevenir el principal productor ubicat a 
Espanya (la seva producció es va multiplicar per 3,5 durant els anys setanta) i en líder 
de ventes en el mercat espanyol (la seva penetració es va incrementar del 23 al 36%). El 
principal objectiu del treball es analitzar els factor que expliquen l’èxit de FASA-
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  In the 1950s, the Franco regime came to realise that foreign investment was a 
“necessary evil” that Spain would have to endure for the sake of industrialisation. At 
stake was a trade-off between a protected local market on the one hand and investment 
and technology on the other. Although the regime’s objective was to pursue an import 
substitution policy, Spain had neither the capital nor the technology needed to develop 
growth industries spurred by the second technological revolution. However, the 
implementation of a policy of this kind could only work with the help of direct foreign 
investment channelled through joint ventures with local initiatives. Spain’s appeal lay in 
its protected domestic market and, given its size, its tremendous potential for growth. 
This is the model that describes how the automotive industry developed in Spain during 
the 1950s and 1960s (Catalan 2000, 2006 and 2010; García, 2001 and 2003; Fernández-
de-Sevilla, 2010a and 2010b). 
 
  The weakness of the strategy lies in the fact that foreign companies taking part 
in this kind of development process will rarely manufacture innovative products or 
transfer the most up-to-date technology. This is because their protected status enables 
them to sell at high prices and achieve high margins, even in the case of mature and 
obsolete products (Haggard, 1990). The result is that products offered by the companies 
of countries applying this model will rarely be competitive in foreign markets. Yet, once 
the domestic market loses strength, exports become the sole vehicle to continue down 
the road to industrialisation. 
 
  When the limitations of domestic demand became apparent at the end of the 
1960s, Spain changed the strategic direction of industrial policy in its automotive sector, 
switching from focusing all its efforts on an import substitution policy to the promotion 
of exports. With the signing of a Preferential Agreement with the EEC in 1970, Spain 
became an attractive export platform for companies that were not based in EEC member 
states. Automobile giants like Ford and GM initiated contacts with the Spanish 
government to negotiate their establishment on the Iberian Peninsula (Pérez, 2003, 
pp.131-143; Catalan, 2007, pp. 144-156). Their interests coincided with the interests of 
the Franco regime: boosting production through exports. This explains the introduction 
of legislation in 1972, to attract Ford and modernise established carmakers, and in 1979, 
to attract Opel. 
 
  At the level of production, the strategy bore fruit. While Spain exported hardly 
any cars in 1972, exports in the early years of the twenty-first century fluctuated at 
around 80% of a total output level that had quadrupled in size (ANFAC, 2005, p. 46). 
Between the enactment of Ford Decrees and the integration of Spain into the EES, 
Spain ranked first in terms of increased production among the top 10 manufacturers in 
1972 (table 1), while production fell in leading countries like the US, the UK, Italy and 
France. The other countries with the most successful track records were Japan and 
Germany –examples of success in countries with a mature industry. The downside to 
Spanish export success was the decline in the strength of SEAT. As the only company 
with predominantly Spanish shareholders, SEAT suffered hugely from the entrance of 
the US automakers and its production fell 43% between 1973 and 1981 (Catalan, 2000, 
p. 150). By implication, Spain delivered the sector completely into foreign hands and 





  Table 1. Passenger cars produced by countries* (thousand of units).
  Spain Canada  Italy  UK  France Germany  ** Japan USA 
1972  614  1,154 1,732 1,921  2,993  3,654  4,022 8,824 
1985  1,220  1,075 1,384 1,048  2,631  4,375  7,647 8,002 
1972 =100  199  93  80  55  88  120  190  91 
* These are the 8 major passenger cars manufacturers in 1972 plus Spain. 
** Has joined the production of the FRG and the GDR. 
SOURCE: Own elaboration with UN, Statistical Yearbooks. 
 
  In the case of Renault, its relations with its Spanish subsidiary went through 
three phases. Prior to 1961, Renault limited its contribution to FASA to manufacturing 
licences. Between 1961 and 1965, Renault participated financially in FASA’s 
expansion. Then, from 1965, Renault took control of the Spanish company, 
transforming it into FASA-Renault (Sánchez, 2004, pp. 159-162; 2006, 362-366; 
Fernández-de-Sevilla, 2010b, pp. 476-479). In the nineteen seventies, FASA-Renault 
was fully integrated into Renault’s global strategy and became the Renault Group’s 
principal investment in foreign production (table 2). During this period, FASA-Renault 
was not only fully integrated into Renault’s synergies, but it also rose to become the 
production and sales leader in Spain by 1980.  
 
Table 2. Production of Renault vehicles outside France (No.). 
  1960 1965 1970 1975 1980 
FASA-Renault  Production  8,407  47,326  98,720 205,934 341,211 
FASA-Renault  Exports  0  *506 **5,600  38,303 123,625 
Exports as (%) of Production  0  1.1  5.7  18.6  36.2 
Renault  foreign  production  117,000 153,910 336,607 559,257 806,438 
FASA-Renault as % of foreign production  7.2  30.7  29.3  36.8  42.3 
* Exports in 1966. 
** Exports in 1971. 
SOURCE: Own elaboration with FASA-Renault: Annual Reports, 1960-1980. Renault foreign production in Loubet, 
2000, p. 221. 
 
This paper sets out to examine the development of FASA-Renault during the 
1970s until the company reached its highpoint of growth in 1980. In the period in 
question, the Spanish economy was plunged into a deep recession from which it did not 
emerge until the mid-1980s. The Spanish recession followed in the wake of the 
economic crisis that gripped Western economies in 1974 and continued in most 
industrialised countries until 1983. However, the impact of the recession in Spain was 
deeper and lasted longer, easing its grip only in 1985. As a result, the period under 
analysis covers the expansion phase of FASA-Renault, which came to an end in 1980 
and does not fall exactly inside the economic cycle. The main aim of the paper is to 
study the factors that enabled FASA-Renault to obtain strong growth against a backdrop 
of profound turbulence and to adapt successfully to Spain’s new role in the automotive 
sector as an international centre for the production of mid-to-low range passenger car 
models.  
 
2. The Automotive Industry in Spain, 1953-1972 
 
  The present-day Spanish automotive industry dates back to the mid-twentieth 
century, when SEAT and FASA were created. The two companies manufactured 
passenger cars under licence from Fiat and Renault respectively. Both brought out their 
first vehicles in 1953. In that year, with a total of 2,052 passenger cars, Spain ranked 
eighteenth globally among nations manufacturing passenger cars. However, by 1972, 




323). At that time, automakers included not only SEAT and FASA, but also Citroën 
Hispania, Chrysler Spain (Barreiros) and AUTHI (British Leyland). Between 1953 and 
1972, the sector’s average annual growth rate stood at 33.2%.  
 
The number of automakers distinguishes the two phases that characterise the 
take-off period of the Spanish automotive industry. The period 1965-1967 may be 
viewed as the boundary that marks the end of the first phase and the start of the second. 
Until 1965, the Spanish automobile market was a de facto duopoly, in which FASA 
produced (and sold) between a quarter and a third of all passenger cars and SEAT 
accounted for the rest. In 1961, Citroën Hispania began operations, although its output 
was of little significance until 1966, when it approached 25,000 units. In 1966, 
Barreiros Diesel, under license from Chrysler, began production of the Simca 1000 and 
the Dodge Dart. A year later, production began at AUTHI, a company that 
manufactured under licence from British Leyland
1. At this point, the gap between 
supply and demand vanished, causing immediate pressure on the market. This structural 
change forced the development of new business strategies. Foremost among these were 
the expansion of ranges (more models and more variants) and the creation of finance 
companies. In addition, foreign markets came to be seen as a possible solution to 
surplus production.  
 
However, the factors that explain the development of the automotive industry in 
Spain remained quite stable throughout the period. At the outset, the market was 
practically empty and closed to foreign production
2. The automobile industry was 
developed by producing for that market. In addition, the automakers reaped benefits 
from the government’s power to determine which companies and what conditions were 
established in Spain. As a trade-off, the automakers faced requirements to achieve high 
percentages of domestic production. 
 
  In the case of FASA (FASA-Renault), the company raised production from 707 
passenger cars in 1953 to 138,748 in 1972, at an average annual growth rate of 30.21%. 
In the nineteen fifties, FASA’s annual production always stood below the entry 
threshold for mass production, quantified at 10,000 units annually (Catalan, 2006, p. 
148). The primary cause lay in the investor lethargy of Banco Santander, the principal 
shareholder between 1955 and 1961 (Fernández-de-Sevilla, 2010a, pp. 148-153). FASA 
began to take off only when Banco Santander sold its shares to Banco Ibérico. The new 
owner sharply raised investment levels (Fernández-de-Sevilla, 2010a, pp. 479-486). By 
1965, FASA’s production had climbed as high as 26.6% of total Spanish production. 
The year 1965 was also when Renault became the top shareholder, transforming the 
company into FASA-Renault. With French backing, the company began to grow 
tremendously, topping 100,000 annual units by 1971. At that time, FASA-Renault was 
Renault’s main production centre for cars outside France. In addition, FASA-Renault 
had successfully integrated the manufacture of engines and gearboxes, which enjoyed 
high export levels in the 1970s (Fernández-de-Sevilla, 2010b, pp. 479-486). 
 
                                                 
1 The production of passenger cars by Citroën Hispania stood at 24,373 units in 1966 and 26,981 units in 
1970; production at Barreiros was 48,218 units in 1966 and 36,979 in 1970; production at AUTHI was 
14,645 in 1967 and 18,570 in 1970 (Catalan, 2000, p. 150).  
2 In addition to practically total protection of the sector (set at 90% over the sales price at origin), there 
was also an import quota system (import exemptions set the number of vehicles that could be imported 




By 1970, however, FASA-Renault’s share of total Spanish production had 
declined to 20.6% as a result of the number of automakers. In the late 1960s, it became 
critical to have a commercial network able to promote products inside an increasingly 
competitive marketplace. To do so, drawing on Renault’s sales experience was 
essential, because the Spanish market at that time was experiencing the same problems 
experienced by France in the 1950s. During the latter half of the sixties, Renault 
supplied its Iberian subsidiary with the capabilities of marketing, distribution and 
management
3 that Chandler described as necessary to compete in domestic and foreign 
markets (Fernández-de-Sevilla, 2010b, pp. 480-483). These transfers bore fruit in the 
1970s.  
 
3. The Oil Crisis and the Success of the Japanese Automotive Industry 
 
  The period in question can be characterised by the exhaustion of the pattern of 
accumulation arising from post-war growth. The first signs of weakness surfaced in the 
late 1960s and became particularly acute from 1973 onwards due to oil price hikes. 
Over a period of little more than two months –on 16 October and 23 December 1973– 
OPEC pushed through two dramatic hikes in the price of crude, which quadrupled in 
price. The impact on Western economies, which had mostly replaced coal with fossil 
fuels as a principal energy source, was devastating. 
 
The structural imbalances that undermined the growth of OECD economies 
included the collapse of the Bretton Woods international monetary system; the fall in 
the rate of productivity growth caused by exhausting the growth potential of the 
innovations coming out of the Second Technological Revolution; rises in nominal 
salaries outstripping productivity gains as a result of strong inflationary pressures on 
real salaries; and falling corporate profits resulting from tighter trading margins and the 
subsequent collapse in capital expenditure. 
 
The resulting economic crisis was basically industrial in nature. The explosion 
of prices affected industry more acutely than any other economic activity, with the 
exception of transport. The blow hit the automobile industry particularly hard, marking 
a turning point for the industry that would lead to significant structural changes. 
However, not all automakers reacted with the same speed to signals that pointed to a 
need for change. The quickest to adapt were the Japanese manufacturers, thanks to 
models of production that eventually brought the prevailing model of Fordism to its 
knees. The emergence of Japan’s great automakers stoked international competition. 
 
  After its take-off in the 1950s and 1960s, the Japanese automotive industry 
consolidated itself in the 1970s and 1980s. From 1950 to 1973, Japan jumped from 
tenth to second place in the rankings of automakers (in units produced). Between 1973 
and 1996, Japan’s output leapt from 55% of US output to 88% (table 1). In the same 
period, Japanese companies also became international, pushing into the US, European 
and Asian markets by means of productive investment. Japanese success was largely 
embodied by the company Toyota. While other companies around the globe suffered 
from the recession, Toyota was able to stay on its growth path and maintain profit 
levels. It appeared that Toyota’s system of production was made to weather the crisis 
(Ohno, 1982, p. 83 and Shimizu, 1998, pp. 73-77). 
                                                 





The success of companies like Toyota and Honda stems from their adoption of 
production practices that broke with the common practices of the time. At the beginning 
of the 1990s, the concept of “lean production” emerged to define the set of practices that 
were part of what became known as the Japanese production model, which was more 
competitive than the Western model (Womack, Jones and Roos, 1990). A production 
system is lean when it uses less of everything than mass production does –less human 
effort in the factory, less space for manufacturing, less capital expenditure on tools, 
fewer hours of engineering work to develop a new product. At the same time, it 
produces a greater variety of products with fewer production defects, and it requires far 
fewer factory stocks (Womack, Jones and Roos, 1990, p.13). 
 
  However, other authors argued that such theorizing stemmed from a particular 
synthesis of the productive systems of two companies with different strategies. 
Therefore, they considered that Lean Production represented a conceptual confusion and 
not a real productive model. In their view, Japan had started two distinct productive 
models: the Toyota model, based on an ongoing strategy to reduce costs, and the Honda 
model, based on innovation and flexibility (Mair, 1998, pp. 113-120, Shimizu, 1998, pp. 
63-80 and Boyer anf Freyssenet, 2000, p. 77-100). Beside these models, Nissan opted 
for the strategy of volume and diversity, without succeeding at becoming Sloanist 
(Freyssenet, 1998, pp. 18-21).    
 
  The Toyota Production System (TPS) is a model of production that completely 
eliminates unnecessary elements from production in order to cut costs as much as 
possible. This is achieved by combining two key practices: Just-in-Time (JIT) and 
Autonomation. JIT relies on three production methods –smoothing production, 
designing processes based on multi-function workers, and standardisation of jobs
4– that 
are managed by a system called Kanban
5. Autonomation is a quality control mechanism 
that addresses defects in work, machines and production lines. The control is carried out 
by the worker and the work team through the Yo-i-don system
6 and it makes use of a 




In addition to adopting JIT and Autonomation, the TPS also involves 
outsourcing productive and service activities that are not part of the company’s core 
activities. Because Toyota’s profits come from keeping costs low, the elimination of 
wasteful practices and overproduction is a central concept of TPS (Ohno, 1982, p. 87-
94). For the system to work, it is also necessary for suppliers to apply the same 
production guidelines. Toyota achieves this through supplier loyalty programmes 
(Womack, Jones and Roos, 1990, pp. 146-153; Sako, 1996, pp. 663-664 and 2000, pp. 
114-126). As a consequence, Toyota gives less priority to innovation (preferring to copy 
models already validated in the marketplace), volume (only increasing output when 
                                                 
4 This is teamwork based on multi-skilling and job rotation. 
5 The Kanban system is a management information system that tries to harmonise the quantities produced 
in each production process (Monden, 1981, pp. 140-141). 
6 The Yo-i-don system is a method to smooth product flows generated within the production system 
(Monden, 1981, pp. 143-144). 
7 In TPS, workers take part in cost reduction in order to achieve greater competitiveness in exchange for 
job security. But, to reduce downtime, they also accept performance-related pay (Shimizu, 1998, 64-68 




economic resources allow it) and diversification (only launching new models when the 
market demands it) (Boyer and Freyssenet, 2000, pp. 77-88). 
 
  For its part, Honda applies a model that differs from Toyota’s. The Honda 
model, which also proved responsive to the economic changes of the 1970s, is based on 
innovation and flexibility (Mair, 1998, 113-120 and Boyer and Freyssenet, 2000, p. 89-
100). At Honda, these two concepts went hand in hand, because the company’s strategy 
necessitated the ability to abandon unsuccessful models rapidly and raise production 
whenever an innovation was well received in the marketplace. Honda’s aim was to 
create and exploit returns to innovation for the greatest possible period of time by 
anticipating market expectations. In the 1970s and 80s, the success of this strategy was 
beyond question: by 1990, Honda had doubled its 1980 production level, reaching 
eighth place worldwide. Its chief innovation was the Compound Vortex Controlled 
Combustion (CVCC) engine, a 1500 cc engine that reduced emission levels and fuel 
usage. The CVCC was put in the Honda Civic in 1973 before fuel prices skyrocketed. In 
1976, the number of units sold reached one million; two million were sold in 1979 and 
three million in 1982 (Mair, 1998, p. 115). 
 
4. Renault and the French Automotive Industry in the 1970s 
 
In addition to Japan’s success, two French automakers –Renault and Peugeot– 
also experienced a period of growth in the 1970s. After a precipitous fall in sales 
starting in the autumn of 1973, both companies experienced sharp rises starting in 
1975
8. The upward dynamic of the two automakers was cut short in 1979, with the 
second oil shock. 
 
  Drawing on its pre-war legacy, Peugeot moved into the immediate post-war era 
as a specialist in mid-to-high range autos. The French automaker did not change to a 
full-range strategy until 1965, when it launched the Peugeot 204 for the mid-to-low 
range market. Peugeot’s most successful models were the 204 (1100 cc), the 304 (1300 
cc) and, especially, the 504 (2000 cc). The company’s success in the 1970s was due to 
two key factors. First, when demand swung toward smaller models, the Peugeot 104 
and 204 turned out to be perfectly suited to the new consumer tastes. Second, higher 
petrol prices led to a sharp rise in demand for diesel models. As the only full-range 
automaker using diesel engines throughout its range, Peugeot had no difficulty in 
conquering this new niche in the market.  
 
  In contrast, at Citroën the first oil crisis exposed serious structural difficulties. 
Modernisation could only be achieved with financial outlays that the Michelin family 
was unwilling to provide, given that their strategy focused on tyre manufacturing. As a 
result, in 1974 the Michelin family proposed that Peugeot acquire their automotive 
subsidiary. The acquisition, which involved an exchange of shares, could not be 
finalised until 1976. However, at that point, Peugeot SA became PSA Peugeot Citroën
9. 
For Peugeot, one of the most positive aspects of the acquisition was that it could 
consolidate its position in Europe, particularly with an opening into Spain. Shortly later, 
the president of Chrysler France proposed that PSA purchase Chrysler’s European 
                                                 
8 In 1974, sales fell by 12.7% (Loubet, 2001, p. 374). 





10. In 1978, PSA created a third automotive division to put alongside 
Peugeot and Citroën. The new division, which was called Talbot, consisted of Simca 
(France), Rootes (UK) and Chrysler Spain. 
 
  Renault managed to sidestep the effects of the crisis and strengthen its leadership 
of the French market
11. The company based its success on the R5
12. The conception of 
the R5, which came to be known as the “auto of the crisis”, began in 1968 and the 
model hit the market in 1972. Taking its inspiration from the R4, the R5 had the same 
price, but it also had more modern, more attractive bodywork. While the R5 was on the 
drawing board, the competition –specifically Fiat and VW– were moving closer to the 
idea of a multi-function car, which the R4 embodied. As a result, Renault shifted the 
aim of its prototype toward a virgin segment that had been unexploited: the second 
car
13, a segment tied to the rise in motorisation of the young and, particularly, of 
women
14. The result was a model with subtle curves and harmonious lines that was 
small, compact and multi-function and was able to beat its main rival, Fiat’s 127. 
Although the 127 was mechanically superior, the R5 had a clear aesthetic edge when the 
two models stood side by side (Loubet, 2000, p. 175).  
 
Renault decided to use its star vehicle to conquer several market segments. The 
automaker quickly created a veritable sub-range of the R5 that included a great variety 
of versions: L, TL, GTL, LS, TS, GTX, Automatic, Alpine and Turbo
15. The different 
models targeted different segments of the market. As a result, the price spread within 
the R5 sub-range was nearly the same as the price spread across the entire Renault 
range. RNUR had introduced a new commercial concept to Europe: the range within the 
range. And they applied it to all of their models. The crisis had served to give a new 
direction to the overall conception of the Renault range.  
 
Advertising played a central role within Renault’s strategy. The automaker’s 
communication policy was one of the factors that accounted for its rising sales during 
the crisis. One of the policy’s architects was Renault’s young commercial director, 
Philippe Lamirault, who knew how to use the company’s enormous commercial 
network to conquer expanding market niches. This was made possible by pouring 
immense financial resources into advertising: Renault spent up to ten times more money 
on advertising than Peugeot (Loubet, 2000, p. 184). 
 
  French automakers quickly became aware of the success of Japan’s auto 
industry. The engineers at the Peugeot-Renault Association (APR)
16 visited Japan in 
June 1973 to gain first-hand knowledge of the Japanese auto industry. They observed 
                                                 
10 Chrysler, with 15.5% of the share capital, became the second largest shareholder in PSA; Michelin, 
with 7%, fell to third place. 
11 In 1980, Renault’s sales represented 40% of the total number of autos sold in France (Loubet, 2001, p. 
379). 
12 In 1974, the R5 represented 30.3% of Renault’s sales in France. By 1981, this percentage had risen to 
39.8%, which was 15.4% of the French market (Loubet, 2000, p. 176). 
13 At the beginning of the nineteen seventies, second cars represented barely 4% of the demand (Loubet, 
2000, p. 175). 
14 Renault hit the mark: in 1972, 31% of individuals buying the R5 were women and 35% were under 30 
years of age (Loubet, 2000, p. 176). 
15 These versions range from 4-8 HP and from 845-1397 cc. (Loubet, 2000, p. 176). 
16 The APR continued to function well until it reached a dead-end with the absorption of Citroën (Loubet, 




the stark differences between Japanese and French practices, starting with weak 
integration offset by purchasing from suppliers who were completely mechanised and 
shared the same production philosophy. However, the Japanese advantage lay in high 
productivity, which stemmed from heavy automation (Womack, Jones, Roos, 1990, p. 
95). It was Loubet’s view that heavy automation could be traced to the relative scarcity 
of labour (Loubet 2001, pp. 383-384). Unlike France, which had an abundance of 
immigrant labour, Japan had few skilled immigrants. The conclusion drawn by the APR 
engineers was that Japan did not offer an example to follow, although it represented a 
threat that needed to be addressed. In 1977, pressure from French automakers led the 
French government to limit Japanese sales to 3% of the French market. Both Renault 
and Peugeot experienced a crisis in the 1980s. The reason was the ambitious programs 
promoted in the second half of the 1970s (Loubet, 2008, pp.132-136). 
 
5. The Spanish Economy in the 1970s 
 
The recession affecting the Spanish economy between 1974 and 1985 was 
caused by the international recession resulting from two oil shocks and rising crude 
prices. However, the effects on the Spanish economy were much harder and more 
prolonged. This is because Spain’s energy base was weaker, its industrial structure was 
more fragile, and its affected sectors had greater weight. In addition, Spain suffered 
from the accumulated rigidities of thirty years of dictatorship and was at the outset of 
political reforms that called for less strict adjustment policies (Rojo, 1994, p. 193). At a 
structural level, the Spanish economy had a variety of deficiencies, such as the 
relatively greater weighting of industrial sectors with weaker demand, an over-
expansion of capital-intensive activities arising from negative interest rates, an 
extremely high dependency on technology owing to paltry investment in human 
resources, and levels of tax revenue as a percentage of GDP that were far lower than 
other countries in Western Europe (Catalan, 1999, pp. 360-365). In a period of 
stagnation affecting worldwide demand for industrial goods, the growth of competition 
arising from the emergence of newly industrialised countries caused serious problems 
for countries like Spain, which had more severe deficiencies in their productive 
structure. 
 
From the application of the Stabilisation Plan in 1959 up until 1973, the Spanish 
economy experienced dramatic growth at rates which averaged 8% annually and this 
growth entailed a strong convergence between Spain’s per-capita GDP and that of EEC. 
In 1973, however, these growth rates began to plummet. Between 1975 and 1978, 
runaway spending kept annual growth at 4-5%. From that point, however, the hard 
reality of economic tightening pushed growth rates below 2% until 1986 and the 
economy actually contracted in 1981 (Carreras and Tafunell, 2007, p. 366-368). The 
decline in 1974 was due to the first oil shock and the drop in 1979 was linked to the 
second oil shock. As growth declined, a sharp inflationary spiral gained pace. Although 
the rate of inflation had been high since the beginning of the decade, it shot up in 1974 
and reached a peak of 24.7% in 1977: not until 1985 did price rises fall below 10% 
again
17. Early consequences included a sharp drop in employment numbers and higher 
                                                 
17 Between 1974 and 1980, inflation topped 15% and between 1981 and 1984 it remained above 10%, 










  Economic instability was interwoven with profound political instability. In 
December 1973, the Basque organisation ETA assassinated Admiral Carrero Blanco, 
the Spanish prime minister and Franco’s heir apparent. Two years later, in November 
1975, the dictator died and a complicated process of political reform began. In 1977, the 
first legislative elections after the restoration of the monarchy took place and in 
December 1978 a new constitution was passed. The elections of April 1979 resulted in 
the formation of a weak government ruled by the centre-right UCD party. Instability 
grew in parallel with the breakdown of the UCD until, finally, an attempted coup d’état 
occurred on 23 February 1981. Political stability did not return until the Socialist Party 
(PSOE) won an absolute majority in the 1982 elections.  
 
The dictatorship’s lack of social legitimacy at the outset of the crisis caused 
Spanish officials to respond slowly to obvious economic imbalances. No social sector 
wanted to assume the costs of any correction and the government chose to satisfy excess 
demand by means of a lax monetary policy that worsened spiralling prices. Not until 
mid-1977 were the first tough measures taken to contain a situation that threatened the 
country with hyperinflation. The economic programme of the first government to be 
elected since the Spanish Second Republic found expression in the “Moncloa Pacts”, 
which consisted of a social accord reached between all political parties with 
parliamentary representation and basically involved a policy of economic tightening 
aimed at stopping inflation in exchange for political and economic reforms. Monetary 
policy was tightened and restraint was imposed on real-wage growth (Fuentes, 1993, 
42-50 and Trullen, 1993, pp. 200-212). The application of the Moncloa Pacts 
successfully reined in spiralling prices, but reversing inflation was slow. In addition, the 
external disequilibrium was tackled with a sharp devaluation of the peseta
20. Although 
significant surpluses in Spain’s balance of payments occurred in 1978 and 1979, deficits 
returned in 1980 and continued until 1985 when a surplus was achieved again
21. 
 
The gradual collapse of the Franco regime unleashed a wave of pent-up demands 
from workers. After years of high growth and wage restraint in the 1960s, pay shot up 
between Franco’s death in November 1975 and the consolidation of the Moncloa Pacts, 
signed in October 1977. In a context of economic contraction, labour costs grew very 
rapidly and lost any relationship to gains in productivity. Until 1977, companies were 
unable to withstand rising costs –first of raw materials and energy, then of labour. They 
had to resort to increasing indebtedness stimulated by negative real interest rates, which 
were a result of high inflation and financial regulation that delayed changes to interest 
rates. When the financial sector was liberalised in 1978 and expansive monetary policy 
came to end, interest rates shot up. Given the level of debt held by businesses, this 
                                                 
18 Employment fell from 13 million individuals in 1973 to 10.5 million in 1985, while the unemployment 
rate rose sharply from 2.2% to 21.9% over the same period. (Carreras and Tafunell, 2007, p. 367).  
19 Between 1973 and 1985, the growth in capital expenditure was negative for 8 of the years in the period 
(Carreras and Tafunell, 2007, p. 367). 
20 The devaluation, which was 20% in relation to the US dollar, took place in July 1977, in anticipation of 
the Moncloa Pacts. In early 1976, the peseta had already fallen 11% against the dollar (Carreras and 
Tafunell, 2007, pp. 373-374). 
21 Deficits in the periods 1974-77 and 1980-84 exceeded 2 bn US dollars annually. The surpluses in 1978 




aggravated the industrial crisis and a sharp contraction in capital expenditure ensued
22. 
As a result, some authors argue that there is rationale for speaking of a large-scale 
process of industrial disinvestment (Carreras and Tafunell, 2007, p. 383). 
 
6. The Spanish Automotive Industry in the 1970s 
 
The industrial policy applied to the passenger-car sector in the 1970s and 80s 
contrasted sharply with the policy in the two preceding decades. Spain’s Preferential 
Agreement with the EEC, signed in 1970, entailed a lowering of EEC duties on Spanish 
passenger cars exports to 3.3% in 1974. After the agreement, Ford and GM viewed 
Spain as an excellent base of production for mid-to-low range models aimed at the 
European market. The interest of the US giants, which arose at a time of contraction in 
Spain’s domestic market, led the Spanish government to reorient its strategic view of 
the sector. A new policy sought to achieve two objectives: facilitating the establishment 
of big export-led companies and creating incentives for the modernisation of the whole 
sector. However, a substantial part of the strategic policy remained, including import 
restrictions, which were only relaxed at the end of the decade. 
 
  The “Ford decrees”, which became law in late 1972, were the visual sign of this 
change of strategy
23. The first Ford decree (30 November) lowered the minimum 
requirement of nationalisation for new manufacturers from 90% to 50%; established a 
threshold for asset investment at 10 bn pesetas; required exports equivalent to two-
thirds of production, limited domestic sales to 10% of last year sales in the domestic 
market. These conditions perfectly suited Ford’s interests. As compensation, previously 
established automakers were given lower requirements of “local content” in their 
exports.  
 
The second Ford decree (23 December) declared the sector of preferential 
interest and gave incentives for land expropriation, tax breaks and freedom to amortize 
facilities in the first five years to any established companies able to meet the following 
objectives by 1976: production per working day of 500 units, fixed asset investment 
over 7 billion pesetas and minimum exports at 20% of production. With this approach, 
the government sought to expand the size and efficiency of the automobile industry. At 
that time, the Spanish minister of industry predicted that production in 1977 would 
reach 1.3 million units, with 500,000 units aimed at the export market
24. 
 
On 30 December 1972, Ford submitted an application to build a factory in 
Valencia at an investment of 310 million dollars. Ford had revived its old intention to 
make Spain an export platform for cars targeted at Europe
25. Production began in 1976 
                                                 
22 Between 1974 and 1985, gross fixed capital formation fell 20% and rose in only one year, 1980 
(Carreras y Tafunell, 2007, p. 479).  
23 The policy was reaffirmed in 1979 with the passage of the so-called “Opel decree”, which set the 
requirement for “local content” at 55%, put minimum production at 600 vehicles per working day and 
specified an export percentage of 65%, in accordance with GM’s intentions. To compensate for this 
change, established automakers received lower requirements for local content, which fell from 90% to 
60%.  
24 FASA-Renault: Actas del Consejo, 12-IV-1973. 
25 Ford started assembling autos in Spain in 1920 with the opening of a factory in Cadiz, which closed in 
1921. In 1923, Ford opened a new plant in Barcelona. In 1929, Ford transferred 40% of its share capital to 
Spanish shareholders and became Ford Motor Ibérica. The Spanish Civil War in 1936-39 frustrated 




and it topped 250,000 cars two years later. The model was the Fiesta, a small car that 
competed head-to-head against the star products of SEAT (the 127) and FASA-Renault 
(the R5).  
 
  Ford’s strategy was the antithesis of the strategies that had been applied in Spain 
to that point: it manufactured a single model that was completely integrated in its 
European strategy, producing every component in one (or, at most, two) of its three 
Fiesta production centres in Dagenham (UK), Saarlouis (West Germany) and Valencia. 
Ford’s entry into the market intensified competition in Spain’s domestic market and put 
the efficiency of Spanish producers to the test. In the end, SEAT paid the price for 
Ford’s entry; the old national champion experienced a steep drop in its market share. By 
contrast, FASA-Renault applied a strategy that more closely resembled Ford’s strategy 
and it took over commercial and production leadership in Spain (table 3). 
 
Table 3: Production (P) and Sales (S) in Spain by Brand (%) 
 SEAT  Renault  Citroën  Ford 
  P S P S  P S P S 
1970 60.7 55.2 21.4 21.3  5.8  6.2    0.3 
1971 55.5 54.1 24.1 22.7  8.1  6.4    0.2 
1972 54.7 53.0 22.6 24.1  6.8  5.6    0.2 
1973 49.6 51.0 25.2 24.2  7.2  6.1    0.3 
1974 50.1 50.1 25.4 26.3  9.7  8.1    0.2 
1975 46.4 47.3 29.0 27.1  13.1  9.6    0.2 
1976 44.9 48.3 27.8 25.5  14.2 10.3  2.3  1.7 
1977 35.2 38.6 24.1 27.2  9.6 11.6 21.6  9.2 
1978 28.7 35.7 25.1 27.8  10.0 11.0 26.3 10.2 
1979 31.2 30.4 29.3 29.9  7.7 10.5 24.1 11.0 
1980 28.1 26.0 32.6 35.2  8.1  6.6 24.9 12.3 
SOURCE: Own elaboration. Production: Catalan, 2000, p. 150 and FASA-Renault, Report, 1970-80. Sales: DGT, Report. 
 
Similarly, in order to meet their commitment to export 20% of production, the 
companies intensified their policy of integrating into the overall strategies of their head 
offices abroad. One way was to strengthen their production of technologically backward 
models aimed at EEC markets. By doing this, Spanish subsidiaries filled in gaps in the 
ranges offered by their head offices, thus saving same the costs of manufacturing non-
competitive models in short runs. This was the direction followed by Citroën, Chrysler 
and AUTHI. The alternative was to focus on integrated projects that would be 
competitive within Europe, as SEAT and FASA-Renault did with their 127 and R5, 
respectively. 
 
  Exports offered an escape valve in the face of a shrinking domestic market. 
Between 1975 and 1980, the weight of exports (as a percentage of export units out of 
units sold) rose from 22% to 46%. The Preferential Agreement with the EEC 
established a regulatory framework that enabled the attainment of significant export 
percentages. In contrast with thinking in the 1960s, the real foreign market was Europe, 
not Latin America. The national markets of the automakers’ head offices constituted the 
main destination of foreign sales from the automotive industry located in Spain. 
 
7. FASA-Renault Commercial and industrial expansion during the 1970s 
                                                                                                                                               
its remaining shares to local shareholders and the resulting company became Motor Ibérica, which broke 






  During the 1970s, the car market in Spain experienced a loss of strength and an 
intensification of competition. Between 1974 and 1980, car registrations in Spain 
experienced a negative growth: the total amount in 1980 was lower than in 1973 (table 
4). At the same time, due to the entrance of Ford in the Spanish market, there was an 
intensification of competition from 1976 onwards. In this context, FASA-Renault had to 
face two additional problems: the authorized price system in passenger cars and an 
increase of labour disputes. In order to address this situation, FASA-Renault decided to 
gain efficiency by increasing its industrial capacity to make a better use of the 
economies of scale. At a commercial level, the strategy of FASA-Renault was based on 
an increase in sales in Spain and an offset of the sluggish domestic market through a 
significant increase in exports. 
 
Table 4: Car Registrations and Sales 
 FASA-Renault  Sales  Spain 
Registrations* 
FASA-Renault 
Share    Spain (No)  Exports (No)  Total (No) 
1970 93,854    93,854  410,911  22.8 
1971 106,496  5,600  112,096  440,224  24.2 
1972 131,484  10,348  141,832  510,979  25.7 
1973 159,712  19,157  178,869  597,770  26.7 
1974 166,706  20,957  187,663  584,234  28.5 
1975 163,986  38,303  202,289  581,483  28.2 
1976 165,593  42,530  208,123  623,991  26.5 
1977 193,752  50,103  243,855  664,906  29.1 
1978 192,605  57,453  250,058  657,142  29.3 
1979 197,239  76,860  274,099  623,325  31.6 
1980 209,248  123,625  332,873  581,617  36.0 
  Spain (growth)  Exports (growth)  Total (growth)  Spain Registrations 
(growth) 
 
1970        
1971 13.5    19.4  7,1 
1972 23.5  84.8  26.5  16,1 
1973 21.5  85.1  26.1  17,0 
1974 4.4  9.4  4.9  -2,3 
1975 -1.6  82.8  7.8  -0,5 
1976 1.0  11.0  2.9  7,3 
1977 17.0  17.8  17.2  6,6 
1978 -0.6  14.7  2.5  -1,2 
1979 2.4  33.8  9.6  -5,1 
1980 6.1  60.8  21.4  -6,7 
* Car registration in Peninsula and Balearic Islands (including imports). 
SOURCE: FASA-Renault, Annual Reports (1970-80). 
 
  Regarding automobile industry, prices were highly conditioned by the costs of 
the products provided by the auxiliary industry, which were in turn influenced by the 
prices of raw materials and semi-manufacture goods. Furthermore, we must add the 
high pressure caused by wage costs. In 1973, the increase of wages was linked to the 
inflation of previous year. In that year, inflation was running at 10%, it exceeded 15% 
the rest of the decade and it rose to a maximum of 24.7% in 1977. Labour cost had a 
strong effect both on auxiliary industry and carmakers. The authorized price system in 
the passenger cars that had effects on the automotive industry prevented the increase on 
costs from having impact on the final price of vehicles. The increasing gap between 
costs and prices became a real trouble for FASA-Renault. This shift was extremely 





Table 5 (1970 = 100) 
  General price index  FASA-Renault car prices 
1970 100  100 
1971 109  105 
1972 118  105 
1973 131  109 
1974 151  122 
1975 176  139 
1976 207  157 
SOURCE: Spain: Prados (2003). FASA-Renault, Annual Reports (1970-1976). 
 
Labour disputes started within FASA-Renault before the oil crisis, and became a 
sign that both the accumulation model of post-war and Franco’s regime were coming to 
an end. In 1970 all big firms located in Spain counted with a vertical union that was the 
only authorised agent to negotiate on behalf of the staff collective agreements and act as 
a mediator in individual disputes. However, in the firsts 1970s informal discussion 
groups appeared in FASA-Renault factories. They drifted away from vertical union and 
ended up being general assemblies themselves. This clandestine movement was focused 
on the labour fight but also on a political struggle against Franco. Disputes started 
within the factories of FASA-Renault became the core for political mobilisation against 
Franco in Valladolid (Charron, 1990, p. 52 and 1998, p. 259). 
 
  The first actions promoted with these meetings took place in 1972 and included 
one or two-hour strikes. The first major strike took place in January 1974 and lasted 19 
days. In September a new cycle of protests started and led to the strike of December 
1974
26. Meanwhile, the second assembly factory in Valladolid was set fire –where ten 
people died–, there was a three-day lock-out, as well as numerous demonstrations that 
end up with street riots in Valladolid. In April 1975, another series of strikes took place. 
It should also be highlighted the occupation of the industrial complex of Valladolid and 
the forceful eviction by police after 36 hours
27. The last strike of that period of labour 
disputes took place in January 1976
28. After that strike, workers achieved both their 
demands regarding timetables –a 44 working hour week– and the reemployment of a 
hundred workers that had been fired during the strike in April 1975
29. As table 6 shows, 
between 1970 and 1978 wage costs significantly increased in the cost structure of 
FASA-Renault, which points out the capacity of workers to put pressure on enterprises, 
even more when it is found out that peak of this ratio was reached between 1976 and 
1978, right at the end of the labour disputes cycle
30. 
 
Table 6: Cost structure of FASA-Renault (%) 
 
Manufacturing, commercial and 




1971 73,3 17,2  1,8  7,7 
                                                 
26 It stopped producing 19,000 cars, up 8% of the production and sales of FASA-Renault (FASA-Renault, 
Annual Report, 1974). 
27 FASA-Renault, Minute of the Board, 30 April 1975. 
28 As a result, FASA-Renault failed to produce 21,000 cars (FASA-Renault, Annual Report, 1976). 
29 The most common claims involve both working time and hierarchical relations. In contrast, the amount 
of wages and the inequality between different labour categories are very little in the claims (Charron 
1990, p. 52). 
30 Strikes reappeared in February and March 1979 following both the renegotiation of the collective 
agreement and the dismissal of 600 workers in Palencia. The dispute meant a loss of 17,579 cars in 1979 




1972 72,7 18,0  1,6  7,7 
1973 72,0 19,2  1,7  7,1 
1974 69,5 22,0  2,2  6,2 
1975 67,8 25,4  2,0  4,8 
1976 66,4 27,3  1,9  4,5 
1977 64,9 27,6  2,0  5,4 
1978 64,8 28,3  2,4  4,6 
1979 65,6 25,4  2,1  6,8 
1980 66,8 22,7  1,1  9,3 
SURCE: Own Elaboration with FASA-Renault, Annual Reports (1971-1980). 
   
  The worsening of labour disputes together with the authorised price system in 
passenger cars resulted in a significant erosion of both the benefits and the profit 
margins of FASA-Renault (table 7). As a result, the company faced a limited capacity 
for self-financing
31. Moreover, the problem was aggravated by the situation of the 
Spanish financial sector. In order to handle that, FASA-Renault was forced to turn to 
alternative funding formulas, such as share capital increase –mostly subscribed by 
Renault– and bond issues (table 7). As a result, in 1979 Renault have 71% of FASA-
Renault equity (Carron, 1978, p. 257). The result was a sever setback in FASA-Renault 
industrial expansion projects. The most affected project was the construction of the third 
assembly plant located in Palencia. 
 
Table 7: FASA-Renault: permanent capital (million pesetas) 
  Equity E  Long-term liabilities (LTL)  E plus LTL  Profits  Profit margin (P/S)* (%) 
1970 2.900  634  3.534  489  12,7 
1971 3.303  1.269  4.572  530  4,4 
1972 3.874  2.156  6.030  595  3,7 
1973 4.056  2.646  6.702  630  3,0 
1974 7.764  4.261  12.025  -127  -0,5 
1975 7.238  4.133  11.371  -331  -1,1 
1976 7.111  4.651  11.762  -694  -1,8 
1977 9.663  7.623  17.286  1.660  2,9 
1978 10.247  10.117  20.364  1.229  1,7 
1979 24.935  10.986  35.921  2.989  3,0 
1980 37.140  10.171  47.311  4.370  3,3 
* P=net profits. S=Sales. 
SOURCE: FASA-Renault, Annual Reports (1970-80). 
 
  FASA-Renault ended the 1974-76 triennium with losses. Benefits were not 
achieved until the end of the labour disputes. In 1977, the first year of social peace in 
the factories, coincided with a 10-month period of free pricing regime
32. As a 
consequence, FASA-Renault was able to increase prices by 38.4% (on average)
33. Once 
back to the authorized price system, the consolidation of new prices and the social peace 
prevented from major losses (table 7). However, it should not be forgotten that the 
FASA-Renault profitability was significantly above the average of the non-financial 
Spanish industry in any of its ratings (table 8). Table 8 shows how FASA-Renault 
suffered losses before the bulk of Spanish firms. Yet, its losses had a smaller and lower 
temporal scope. In fact, from 1978 FASA-Renault experienced a most positive 
profitability than the average of Spanish companies. Nevertheless, FASA-Renault 
                                                 
31 FASA-Renault, Minutes of the Board, 27 November 1974. 
32 Between December 1976 and October 1977 the government implemented a free pricing regime in 
passenger cars (FASA-Renault, Minute of Board, 14 December 1976). 




compensates its profitability thanks to increase in investments and the creation of jobs. 
Unlike the Spanish industry as a whole, which highly reduced investments during that 
period, FASA-Renault committed at every turn to encourage investments. As a result, 
while the Spanish economy was destroying jobs, FASA-Renault was creating 
employment (table 9). 
 
Table 8: Spanish firms and FASA-Renault Profitability (P/L)* (%) 
 Spain  Profitability  FASA-Renault 
Profitability 




1970 7,20  6,90  9,00  6,50  12,4 
1971 5,80  4,80  7,90  6,90  10,9 
1972 7,50  7,60  9,20  7,90  11,6 
1973 8,00  9,40  10,90  7,20  11,7 
1974 5,90  7,90  7,90  9,40  -1,6 
1975 4,30  4,20  5,10  6,70  -4,6 
1976 3,70  2,70  3,40  4,10  -9,8 
1977 3,00  -0,40  7,80  -1,50  16,1 
1978 0,60  -8,10  -4,90  -14,00  9,4 
1979 0,50  -6,40  -3,50  -15,00  10,2 
1980 -0,80  -10,20  -5,30  -27,30  10,2 
* P=net profits. L=fixed liabilities. 
SOURCE: Spain Tafunell, 2000, p. 107; FASA-Renault FASA-Renault, Annual Reports,(1970-80). 
 
Table 9: FASA-Renault and its subsidiaries and sales network staff (No) 
 
FASA-Renault 
(FR)  Subsidiaries (S)  FR + S  Sales Network (SN)  FR + S + SN 
1970 8.717  1.650  10.367  6.627  16.994 
1971 10.147  1.733  11.880  7.594  19.474 
1972 12.503  1.689  14.192  7.961  22.153 
1973 15.463  1.915  17.378  8.723  26.101 
1974 16.357  2.009  18.366  9.513  27.879 
1975 17.942  2.081  20.023  10.442  30.465 
1976 19.524  2.023  21.547  11.718  33.265 
1977 20.552  1.981  22.533  11.296  33.829 
1978 21.920  1.983  23.903  13.329  37.232 
1979 22.396  1.970  24.366  13.457  37.823 
1980 22.027  1.990  24.017  14.289  38.306 
SOURCE: FASA-Renault, Annual Reports (1970-80). 
 
  FASA-Renault sought to increase its industrial capacity through a better use of 
the economies of scale to gain competitiveness. Financial problems greatly affected its 
productive capacity. The company had started the 1970s with large investments to 
expand its production capacity. While in 1972 the second assembly factory in 
Valladolid came into operation
34, in 1973 the project of building a new assembly 
factory started in Palencia
35, just 30 kilometres away from Valladolid. However, these 
projects had been slowed down since 1974, leading to stagnation of the production daily 
rhythm (table 10). The stagnation of production was exceeded in 1978, when the factory 
in Palencia came into operation. With the new factory, FASA-Renault could achieve 
1,000 units per day in 1978, which enabled a better supply of the domestic market and 
                                                 
34 FASA-Renault, Minutes of the Board, 20 April 1972. 




an expansion in exports. As a result, in 1980 FASA-Renault was the main producer 
located in Spain, making up 31% of the total car-makers output (table 10). 
 
Table 10: Car production 
 Spain  FASA-Renault  FASA production on Spanish 
production (%)    No Growth  No  Growth  Daily Capacity 
(No) 
1970 479.347  20,6  98.720  16,3  380  20,6 
1971 480.013 0,1  110.328  11,8  430  23,0 
1972 632.585  31,8  138.748  25,8  572  21,9 
1973 746.205  18,0  181.676  30,9  714  24,3 
1974 746.782 0,1  183.458  1,0  760  24,6 
1975 730.840  -2,1  205.934  12,3  910  28,2 
1976 791.388 8,3  212.691  3,3  919  26,9 
1977 1.042.336 31,7  237.502 11,7  928  22,8 
1978 1.055.667  1,3  248.797  4,8  1.033  23,6 
1979 1.040.234  -1,5  277.447 11,5  1.196  26,7 
1980 1.104.293  6,2  341.211 23,0  1.292  30,9 
SOURCE: FASA-Renault: Annual Reports (1970-80). 
 
  With the loss of strength in the domestic market, the strategy of FASA-Renault 
was focused on two axes. On the one hand, it sought the entrance in the Spanish market. 
On the other hand, it sought to offset the domestic weaknesses with a boost on exports 
volume. At the beginning of the 1970s, sales of FASA-Renault in Spain grew faster 
than those in the industry as a whole, once the commercial network had been restored, 
following the footsteps of the French industry (Fernández-de-Sevilla, 2010a, pp. 480-
483). Business strategies became a key element to face competitiveness and FASA-
Renault was highly prepared. The continued expansion of the commercial network was 
one of the strategic goals of the company (table 11). In just ten years, the staff of the 
commercial network went from 6,000 members to more than 14,000 (table 9). This 
allowed sales in Spain to increase steadily –except the setbacks of 1975 and 1977. In 
contrast with the total car registrations, which were lower in 1980 compared to 1973, 
sales of FASA-Renault in 1980 were 30% higher than in 1973. As a result, the entrance 
of Renault in the Spanish market increased significantly to 36% in 1980 (table 4). 
 
Table 11: FASA-Renault, sales network points 
1970 1972 1974 1976 1978 1980 
435 604 677 852 962 1.173 
SOURCE: FASA-Renault, Annual Reports (1970-80). 
 
  However, the rhythm of growing sales in Spain slowed significantly down from 
1974 onwards (table 4). FASA-Renault was able to handle this domestic slowdown with 
a large increase of exports (table 12). The increase in the export volume was made 
possible thanks to its integration into the Renault Group synergies (Charron, 1998, p. 
258). Proof of this is the fact that most foreign sales were addressed to France (table 
12). FASA-Renault sustained its export volume with the R-5, a low-mid range car. As it 
happened with other manufacturer industries installed in Spain, FASA-Renault was 
specialised in the production of mid-to-low range models, some of wich were to be 
exported to the European market. 
 
Table 12: FASA-Renault, Exports 
 
Cars (No)  Destination (%)  Share of exports 
France CKD*  Spain**  On turnover  On production 




1972 10.348  84,9    15,1  8,0  7,5 
1973 19.157  85,8    14,2  12,6  10,5 
1974 20.957  91,7    8,3  12,9  11,4 
1975 38.303  72,0  23,2  4,8  18,2  18,6 
1976 42.530  78,5  16,8  4,7  22,9  20,0 
1977 50.103  84,2  10,3  5,5  20,9  21,1 
1978 57.453  81,0  12,0  6,6  22,8  23,1 
1979 76.860  75,5  16,7  5,4  24,3  27,7 
1980 123.625  73,9  21,4  1,9  33,9  36,2 
* CKD sets were exported to Portugal and Colombia. 
** Canary Islands, Ceuta and Melilla. 
SOURCE: FASA-Renault, Annual Reports, 1971-80. 
 
  The success inside and outside FASA-Renault during the 1970s was based on 
the attractiveness of a new model released in late 1972, just before the outbreak of the 
crisis. The R-5 was the main factor driving the supply of FASA-Renault (table 13). As it 
happened in France, the R-5 had ideal characteristics for both the Spanish market and 
the historic moment that it had to face. Following the path that was giving such good 
results in France, FASA-Renault began to implement the strategy of the range within 
the range with the R-5. In 1975, FASA-Renault released 3 new models: TL (956cc), 
GTL (1.037cc) and TS (1.289cc), covering completely different demands. That range 
was expanded a year later with the R-5 Cup (1.397cc), which replaced the R-8 TS as the 
most important sports car of the company. The R-5 was the mainstay of foreign sales of 
FASA-Renault. Since 1975 onwards, its exports had ranged around 40% of its 
production
36. With the R-5, FASA-Renault was fully integrated within the synergies of 
the Renault. 
 
Table 13: FASA-Renault, production by models (No) 
  R-4 R-8 R-6  R-12  R-5  R-Siete  R-18  R-14 
1970 30.047 34.543 19.128  14.252         
1971 30.523 38.884 22.460  18.208         
1972 30.536 36.456 30.131  37.348  4.085       
1973 30.470 31.417 28.437  51.367  39.789       
1974 30.105 25.199 29.970  45.363  51.411  1.152     
1975 29.113 13.531 28.029  45.649 62.977  26.509     
1976 23.903 3.401  24.848  44.343  88.052  28.089    
1977 28.681   26.464  54.072  97.852  30.322    
1978 37.317   24.806  52.031  100.106  27.269 7.249   
1979 42.443   20.392  32.181  97.628 22.939  59.638 2.226 
1980 45.479   21.838  32.637  146.175 14.334  48.474  32.274 
  FASA-Renault, production by models (%) 
  R-4 R-8 R-6  R-12  R-5  R-Siete  R-18  R-14 
1970  30,7 35,3 19,5  14,5         
1971  27,7 35,3 20,4  16,5         
1972  22,0 26,3 21,7  27,0  2,9       
1973  16,8 17,3 15,7  28,3  21,9       
1974  16,4 13,8 16,4  24,8  28,1  0,6     
1975  14,1 6,6  13,6  22,2  30,6  12,9    
1976  11,2 1,6  11,7  20,9  41,4  13,2    
1977  12,1   11,1  22,8  41,2  12,8    
1978  15,0   10,0  20,9  40,2  11,0 2,9   
1979 15,3    7,3  11,6  35,2  8,3  21,5  0,8 
                                                 




1980 13,3    6,4  9,6  42,8  4,2  14,2  9,5 
SOURCE: FASA-Renault, Annual Reports, 1970-80. 
 
  Although in 1974 the spectacular growing figures of car registrations in previous 
years started to fall down, FASA-Renault, in contrast with the whole industry, managed 
to end up the decade without experiencing any decreases in the production volume. This 
was possible thanks to the intensification of its entrance in the Spanish market, which 
reflected the good image of the brand and the know-how of its commercial network, as 
well as a significant permanent increase in exports. Furthermore, the agreements signed 
with Renault helped to boost exports. In addition, the number of engines and gearboxes 




  Between 1970 and 1980 FASA-Renault was able to increase its entrance in the 
car Spanish market from 23% to 36%. Moreover, whilst the export volume had always 
been non-existent, they began to export more than 100,000 cars. As a result, their 
participation in the Spanish production increased from 20% in 1970 to 31% in 1980, 
when production almost reached 350,000, even if Ford began to produce in 1976. 
FASA-Renault had to face two main problems during these years: the control of prices 
and labour disputes. The authorised price system prevented cost increases to have an 
impact on products, which hindered the capacity of self-financing for industrial 
expansion. Serious labour disputes, due to both the political and the economic crisis, 
caused serious trouble for the production and for the workers labour conditions. What is 
more, these difficulties were combined with the arrival of Ford and a loss of strength in 
the domestic market. 
 
  In order to address the situation, FASA-Renault decided to expand its industrial 
capacity and sales network, using R-5 as the main driving factor for increasing supplies. 
At the same time, they took advantage of exports to compensate for the contraction in 
domestic demand. And as a way to overcome the cost-price gap, they decided to 
increase its industrial capacity, but it was essential to assure there were major 
commercial layouts to guarantee the sales of the production. As Renault did in France 
during the 1950s and 60s, FASA-Renault multiplied sale and post-sale points by 2.7 
(staff was multiplied by 2.2) and used marketing strategies that had already been applied 
and tested in France but were adapted to the Spanish context. Along with the increase in 
domestic sales, FASA-Renault greatly expanded its exports, which were 12 higher 
between 1972 and 1980. 
 
  Because of this, FASA-Renault was able to increase both investment and the 
number of employees while the effects of the crisis in Spanish economy were even 
deeper than in the EEC. Whilst there was an important contraction in growth, a 
galloping inflation, a runaway investment and a destruction of nearly two million jobs 
between 1975 and 1980, FASA-Renault tripled its production capacity, multiplied its 
equity plus long term liabilities by thirteen and doubled its staff team. 
 
  In the 1970s, the most successful models were those that had already been 
launched in the time of its outbreak, and were closer to the new preferences of 
consumers. In that sense it can point the Peugeot Diesels and the Honda Civic. The R-5 
meant a success for FASA-Renault, both in Spain and abroad. Exports were mainly sent 




Renault. As a result, FASA-Renault consolidated as the largest production center of 
Renault outside France. FASA-Renault was able to successfully adapt to the new role 
Spain played in the automotive sector: it became a center of international production of 
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